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APPEALABILITY OF A DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF A
FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSE DISMISSAL MOTION:
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST "CANCELING
OUT" THE BREMEN
INTRODUCTION
In 1972, in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,1 the Supreme Court
reversed a longstanding tradition and held that contracting parties could
agree in advance where they would litigate disputes arising under their
agreement.2 In declaring forum-selection clauses3 presumptively valid,
the Bremen Court set a new high-water mark for freedom-of-contract
principles.4 A forum-selection clause furthers the contracting parties'
fundamental goal of making the economic result of their agreement as
certain and predictable as possible.' In addition, by eliminating potential
jurisdictional struggles between the parties, choice-of-forum agreements
serve important interests of the judicial system.'
1. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
2. See id. at 9-10 (holding forum-selection clauses "are prima facie valid and should
be enforced unless enforcement is shown . . . to be 'unreasonable' under the
circumstances").
3. A contractual provision specifying a particular forum for litigation arising under
the contract is most often referred to as a "forum-selection clause." However, courts
sometimes refer to these clauses as "choice-of-forum provisions," "forum clauses" or "ju-
risdiction clauses." See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate
CommercialAgreements, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 133, 136 n.4. A forum-selection clause can
be exclusive or non-exclusive. An exclusive clause requires that any litigation arising
under the contract be brought only in the designated forum. A non-exclusive clause
permits litigation in the designated forum but does not prohibit an action from being
brought elsewhere. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (citing cases involving
exclusive and non-exclusive clauses). Because only exclusive forum-selection clauses rep-
resent rights that will be irretrievably lost if denied immediate review, this Note is limited
to discussing the appealability of a denial of a motion to dismiss based on an exclusive
forum-selection clause. Unless otherwise indicated, any reference to a forum-selection
clause refers only to an exclusive forum-selection clause.
4. In The Bremen the Supreme Court noted that enforcement of forum-selection
clauses "accords with ancient concepts of freedom of contract." The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
5. See Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65
Ky. L.J. 1, 2 (1976); Gruson, supra note 3, at 133; Juenger, Supreme Court Validation of
Forum-Selection Clauses, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 49, 50 (1972); see also Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) ("we conclude that...
the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of
disputes require[s] that we enforce the parties' [forum-selection] agreement"); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (a forum-selection clause is essential to
achieving "orderliness and predictability" in an international business transaction); The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) ("The elimination of all such
uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum... is an indispensable element in inter-
national trade"). Achieving predictability in commercial transactions is a goal of parties
to both domestic and international contracts. See Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco
Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 279 (9th Cir. 1984) ("we see no reason why the
principles announced in The .Bremen are not equally applicable to the domestic context").
6. A forum-selection clause allows the judicial system to function more efficiently by
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Appellate procedure in the federal courts, however, threatens a drastic
retreat from the gains made by The Bremen. The contractual right pro-
vided by a forum-selection clause may be effectively nullified when a dis-
trict court refuses to dismiss an action brought in violation of the clause.7
If immediate appeal of this decision is denied, the defendant must await
final judgment to have the issue reviewed. Even if the defendant then
obtains a reversal' and a subsequent trial in the contractual forum, this
result will have defeated the primary purpose of the clause-to avoid
being forced to litigate anywhere but in the agreed-upon forum.9
Whether such appeals should be allowed before final judgment is cur-
rently in dispute.° Under a statutory provision known as the final judg-
ment rule, federal appellate jurisdiction extends only to appeals from
"final" judgments of the district courts." An order denying a motion to
dismiss based on a forum-selection clause, because it leaves the contro-
versy pending, cannot technically be called a final judgment. 2 However,
under the limited exception created by the Supreme Court in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.," the order may be immediately appeal-
able as a collateral order."' The federal courts of appeals disagree
"reliev[ing] courts of time consuming pre-trial motions." Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor found the benefits of forum-selection clauses to courts and litigants so strong
that they concluded "[c]ourts should announce and encourage rules that support private
parties who negotiate such clauses." Id.
7. Compare Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir.) (denial of
motion to dismiss based on forum-selection clause held not immediately appealable), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988) with Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodi-
ties, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 850-51 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding immediate appeal of order deny-
ing motion to dismiss on forum-selection clause grounds is necessary to avoid depriving
party of a contractual right).
8. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing whether an erroneous
forum-selection clause order would be an available ground for reversal after final
judgment).
9. The "prime purpose" of an exclusive forum-selection clause is to "confine litiga-
tion between the parties to the [preselected forum]. As a practical matter, such a clause
can have little efficacy unless the courts [not selected in the clause] refuse to hear suits
brought in violation of its terms." Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the
United States, 13. Am. J. Comp. L. 187, 187 (1964).
10. See infra note 15.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). For a detailed discussion of the final judgment rule
see infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
12. See Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 109
S. Ct. 217 (1988); Louisiana Ice Cream Distribs., Inc. v. Carvel Corp., 821 F.2d 1031,
1033 (5th Cir. 1987).
13. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
14. See Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 908 (3d Cir.
1988); Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047, 1048 (3d Cir.
1987); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 850-51
(8th Cir. 1986); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352,
355-56 (3d Cir. 1986); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190,
197 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983); cf Sterling Forest Assocs., Ltd. v. Bar-
nett-Range Corp., 840 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (order denying transfer motion
based on forum-selection clause immediately appealable under Cohen).
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whether Cohen applies to an order denying a motion to dismiss based on
a forum-selection clause.15
Part I of this Note reviews the history of forum-selection clauses and
their present-day status in the federal courts. Part II discusses the final
judgment rule and its underlying policies, and then looks at the Cohen
collateral order doctrine and the competing policies embodied in this ju-
dicial exception. Part III considers the applicability of the Cohen doc-
trine to an order denying a forum-selection clause dismissal motion. The
Note concludes that such an order meets the requirements for appeal as a
collateral order and that the strong federal policy supporting forum-se-
lection clauses will be frustrated by denying immediate review.
I. FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES
A. Background
The common law historically viewed forum-selection clauses as an at-
tempt by contracting parties to "oust" a court of jurisdiction and, as
such, a violation of public policy. 6 Courts reasoned that their jurisdic-
tional power was established by law, and therefore could not be altered
by private agreement. 7 Although its logical basis was not closely ana-
15. The Third and Eighth Circuits have held that a district court order denying a
motion to dismiss on the basis of a contractual forum-selection clause is appealable under
Cohen, see Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848,
850-51 (8th Cir. 1986); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d
190, 193-97 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983), while the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits have held that it is not, see Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 55 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988); Louisiana Ice Cream Distribs., Inc. v. Carvel
Corp., 821 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1987).
On substantially similar issues involving district court denials of other pretrial motions
based on forum-selection clauses the response of the Circuit Courts of Appeals has also
been inconsistent. See, e.g., Sterling Forest Assocs., Ltd. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 840
F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (district court order denying motion to transfer based on
forum-selection clause appealable under Cohen); Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, Inc. v. Per-
kins, 728 F.2d 860, 862-63 (7th Cir.) (per curiam) (district court order denying motion to
remand based on forum-selection clause not appealable under Cohen), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 890 (1984). Some justices on the Supreme Court may not consider the different
procedural labels as a sufficient distinction among these orders and would apparently
apply the same reasoning to any district court interlocutory order refusing to enforce a
contractual forum-selection clause. See Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, 469 U.S. at 892
(White, J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justices White and
Blackmun found "no meaningful distinction" between a Third Circuit case that held an
order denying a dismissal motion based on a forum-selection clause appealable under
Cohen and the Seventh Circuit case petitioning for certiorari, which held that an order
denying a remand motion based on a forum-selection clause is unappealable; the two
dissenting judges saw a direct conflict in the circuits that was "inescapable" and thus
required resolution. See id.
16. See Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874); Carbon Black
Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed,
359 U.S. 180 (1959); Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43
F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82
F. 508 (6th Cir. 1897).
17. See Mutual Reserve Fund, 82 F. at 510; Prince Steam-Shipping Co. v. Lehman, 39
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lyzed, s the common law approach was the prevailing view of state and
federal courts until the mid-twentieth century.19 Eventually, however,
judges began to question the doctrine that forum-selection clauses were
prima facie unenforceable.2"
The decisive turn occurred in 1955 with a landmark Second Circuit
decision. In Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd." the
Court of Appeals upheld a forum-selection clause in an international
shipping contract that provided for exclusive jurisdiction in Swedish
courts.22 The Muller court rejected the view that a forum-selection
clause was an ouster of the court's jurisdiction and held that, by enforc-
ing the clause, it merely declined to exercise its jurisdiction. 3 The
court's jurisdiction thus remained unaffected by the parties' agreement,
but was withheld in order to give effect to the parties' intent.
F. 704, 704, (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889); Gilbert, supra note 5, at 8; Juenger, supra note 5, at 51.
Some courts also held that forum-selection clauses were unenforceable because they
related to the law of remedies as established by the forum, which also could not be af-
fected by private agreement. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 139; Note, Validity of Contrac-
tual Stipulation Giving Exclusive Jurisdiction to the Courts of One State, 45 Yale L.J.
1150, 1150-51 (1936).
18. Some commentators have since questioned the reasoning offered by early courts
following the common law approach; they suggest that the historical judicial hostility to
forum-selection clauses may be explained by other factors, including judges' reluctance to
relinquish cases at a time when they were paid by the number of cases heard. See Gil-
bert, supra note 5, at 9; Reese, supra note 9, at 188-89.
19. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 138.
20. In 1949 Judge Learned Hand commented on the shift in judicial attitudes: "In
truth, I do not believe that, today at least, there is an absolute taboo against such [forum-
selection] contracts at all .... What remains of the doctrine is apparently no more than a
general hostility, which can be over come." Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556,
561 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J., concurring), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949). Some very early
cases did enforce forum-selection clauses. See, e.g., Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass.
19, 66 N.E. 425 (1903); Daley v. People's Bldg., Loan & Say. Ass'n, 178 Mass. 13, 59
N.E. 452 (1901).
21. 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1967) (en
banc).
The dramatic reversal in the judicial attitude toward forum-selection clauses coincided
with a similar revolution in the area of choice-of-law provisions. In the 1950s, courts
began to reject the vested rights doctrine, which fixed the law of the place where the
contract was made as the governing law for any dispute under the agreement. The tradi-
tional vested rights doctrine was replaced by a majority rule that contracts could be gov-
erned on all issues by the law chosen by the parties. See Prebble, Choice of Law to
Determine the Validity and Effects of Contracts: A Comparison of the English and Ameri-
can Approaches to the Conflict of Laws, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 442-44 (1973). The con-
temporaneity of the revolutions in choice-of-law and choice-of-forum jurisprudence is not
accidental, for the policies served by both types of clauses are the same: making the
rights and obligations under the agreement as certain and predictable as possible. See
Gruson, supra note 3, at 134; Gruson, Governing Law Clauses in Commercial Agree-
ments-New York's Approach, 18 Colum. J. Transnat'l L., 323, 323 (1980). The two
coinciding developments can be seen as components of a broader movement toward
greater party autonomy.
22. See Muller, 224 F.2d at 808.
23. See id.; see also Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344
(3d Cir. 1966); Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761, 765 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
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Muller and subsequent cases adopted a standard of reasonableness in
deciding whether to enforce a forum-selection clause.24 This was the ap-
proach later recommended by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, which stated that "[t]he parties' agreement as to the place of the
action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement
will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable."2 An increasing
number of courts began to follow this approach and extend the applica-
tion of the reasonableness test to domestic as well as international forum-
selection clauses.26 Nonetheless, courts did not take quickly to the mod-
em view that contracting parties should be able to agree where they
could be sued; a majority continued to invoke the traditional rule that
forum-selection clauses were contrary to public policy and
unenforceable."
B. Forum-Selection Clauses After The Bremen
Finally, in 1972, the increasingly popular modern view on forum-selec-
tion clause enforceability received the boost it needed to make it the
clearly favored rule.28 In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.2 9 the
Supreme Court held in an eight to one decision that forum-selection
clauses are "prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement
24. See Muller, 224 F.2d at 808; Takemura & Co. v. The S.S. Tsuneshima Maru, 197
F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Skins Trading Corp. v. The S.S. Punta del Este, 180 F.
Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Sociedade Brasileira de Intercambio Comercial E Industrial,
Ltda. v. S.S. Punta Del Este, 135 F. Supp. 394, 395 (D.N.J. 1955).
25. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80 (1971). The Restatement of Con-
tracts, however, had earlier adopted the traditional view that forum-selection clauses
were unenforceable:
A bargain to forego a privilege, that otherwise would exist, to litigate in a Fed-
eral Court rather than a State Court, or in a State Court rather than in a Fed-
eral Court, or otherwise to limit unreasonably the tribunal to which resort may
be had for the enforcement of a possible future right of action ... is illegal.
Restatement of Contracts § 558 (1932).
26. See Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 836-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Central
Contracting Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 1966); Perini Corp. v.
Orion Ins. Co., 331 F. Supp. 453, 456-57 (E.D. Cal. 1971); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron
Co., 326 F. Supp. 121, 123-26 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761, 765
(E.D. Mich. 1967); Central Contracting Co. v. C. E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810,
816 (Pa. 1965).
27. See Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th
Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Muoio v. Italian Line, 228 F. Supp. 290,
292 (E.D. Pa. 1964). In Carbon Black the Court viewed the doctrine that forum-selection
clauses are contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a "universally accepted rule."
See Carbon Black, 254 F.2d at 300-01. Although the modem view remained the minority
position, the debate between proponents of the modem and traditional views grew
sharper. A good example of the debate is presented in the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in In re Unterweser Reederei GMBH, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d
907 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc), vacated on other grounds sub nom. The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
28. See Gilbert, supra note 5, at 24.
29. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
1988]
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is shown . . . to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances."30 In an
opinion resting substantially on grounds of freedom of contract and com-
mercial efficiency, the Court thus unequivocally rejected the longstand-
ing judicial hostility to forum-selection clauses. "The expansion of
American business and industry," the Court said, "will hardly be en-
couraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial
concept that all disputes must be resolved under our law and in our
courts."31 The Court placed a heavy burden of proof on the party oppos-
ing enforcement of the clause: "[I]n the light of present-day commercial
realities.., the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that
it should be set aside."'32
The Bremen quickly took on a formidable stature as the guiding analy-
sis on forum-selection clause enforceability.33 Although its holding
could arguably be limited to suits involving admiralty jurisdiction and
international contracts, federal courts have read the decision as broad
support for upholding forum-selection clauses generally.34
C. Interpretation of Forum-Selection Clauses
The Bremen's principles of commercial efficiency and freedom of con-
tract can be substantially thwarted by a court's interpretation of the fo-
rum-selection clause. By misinterpreting forum-selection clauses, courts
obscure the reasons why orders denying enforcement should be immedi-
ately appealable. For example, in many cases contracting parties intend
30. Id. at 10.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). The Court also finally disposed of the argument that
forum-selection clauses were an attempt to "oust" a court of jurisdiction; this view, the
Court noted, "is hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction." Id. at 12.
33. See Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Ad-
judicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 315 n.99 (1988) (citing nu-
merous cases showing that The Bremen has become the "lodestar" on the issue of forum-
selection clause enforceability in the federal courts, but criticizing the adoption of The
Bremen's analysis in the domestic context).
34. See Mercury Coal & Coke v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel, 696 F.2d 315, 317 (4th
Cir. 1982); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of America, Inc., 683 F.2d 718, 721 (2d Cir.
1982); In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492 F.2d 1294, 1296 (1st
Cir. 1974); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air., Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 234 n.24 (6th
Cir. 1972) (dictum); Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates Lear Jet Corp., 475 F. Supp. 1140,
1143 (W.D. Va. 1979); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 148
(N.D. Tex. 1979); Gruson, supra, note 3, at 149. Implied support for the broader applica-
tion can be found in the Court's observation that its Bremen holding was "merely the
other side" of the proposition announced in National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375
U.S. 311 (1964), that parties can contractually submit to the jurisdiction of a court. See
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972); see also Gruson, supra note
3, at 149 n.58. Further, courts consider the Bremen principles-commercial efficiency
and "the ancient concept" of freedom of contract-equally applicable to domestic forum-
selection clauses. See Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d
273, 279 (9th Cir. 1984); Public Water Supply Dist. No. 1 v. American Ins. Co., 471 F.
Supp. 1071, 1072 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
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to create an exclusive forum-selection clause requiring the parties to
bring any litigation arising under the contract only in the designated fo-
rum.35 This is in contrast to a non-exclusive clause, also called a permis-
sive or consent-to-jurisdiction clause, which merely permits litigation in
the designated forum but does not prohibit an action from being brought
elsewhere.36 The determination of whether the parties intended the fo-
rum-selection clause to be exclusive or non-exclusive is a question of con-
tract interpretation for the court.37 When a court misinterprets the
intent of the parties and construes an exclusive forum-selection clause as
non-exclusive, or fails to make any distinction between the two types of
clauses, it risks depriving a party of a bargained-for contractual right.
In Sterling Forest Associates, Ltd. v. Barnett-Range Corp.,3 the parties
entered into a purchase agreement with a forum-selection clause that
read in part: "[T]he parties agree that in any dispute jurisdiction and
venue shall be in California."39 The district court interpreted this to
mean that jurisdiction existed in California and "elsewhere as well,"'
thus treating the clause as non-exclusive and therefore merely a consent
to jurisdiction in California. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held this interpretation to be "patently erroneous," finding that it
rendered the clause meaningless and redundant because jurisdiction al-
ready existed in California as a matter of law.41 Moreover, the court
found this misinterpretation so egregious as to suggest "evidence of a
continuing hostility to forum selection clauses"'42 and viewed it as "an
attempt to put the Bremen principles to naught through a patently erro-
neous interpretation of the selection clause itself."43
35. See, e.g., LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 6-7
(Ist Cir. 1984); ASM Communications, Inc. v. Allen, 656 F. Supp. 838, 839 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 148 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
36. See, e.g., Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77-78 (9th
Cir. 1987); Keaty v. Freeport Indonesia, Inc., 503 F.2d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1974); First
Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184, 186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally
Gruson, supra note 3, at 134-36 (discussing distinctions between exclusive and non-exclu-
sive clauses).
37. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 134.
38. 840 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988).
39. Id. at 250.
40. Sterling Forest Assocs., Ltd. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1394, 1397
(E.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd, 840 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988).
41. See Sterling Forest Assocs., 840 F.2d at 251. The court found that federal diversity
jurisdiction was proper in California, where the defendant was incorporated. See id.
42. Id. at 252.
43. Id. at 251; see also Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 76
(9th Cir. 1987) (finding clause stating "courts of California... shall have jurisdiction
over ... any action at law" under contract was non-exclusive). Sterling Forest noted that
the use of the word "shall" generally indicates a mandatory intent. See Sterling Forest
Assocs., 840 F.2d at 252. Most courts correctly construe this language as exclusive. See,
e.g., Intermountain Sys., Inc. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D. Colo.
1983) ("venue shall be in Adams County, Colorado"); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr.
Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 148 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ("venue shall be laid in the county where
Titan has its principal offices") (emphasis in original); Public Water Supply Dist. No. 1 v.
American Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1071, 1071 (W.D. Mo. 1979) ("venue shall lie in Mercer
1988]
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The Bremen principles can also be undermined when a court, avoiding
interpretive problems altogether, simply treats all forum-selection clauses
alike. In Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines,' the clause at issue emphati-
cally indicated an exclusionary function: "All controversies that may
arise directly or indirectly in connection or in relation to this.., contract
must be instituted before the judicial authority in Naples, the jurisdiction
of any other authority being expressly renounced and waived."4 The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, ignored the question of whether the clause at issue
was exclusive or non-exclusive. Instead, it viewed the right conferred by
forum-selection clauses generally as merely a "right to have the binding
adjudication of claims occur in a certain forum,"' 46 neglecting to consider
that an exclusive clause not only secures adjudication in a certain forum
but also bars a trial in any other forum. Consequently, the court failed to
see that immediate appeal was essential to protect the claimed right to
avoid trial anywhere except Naples.47
County, State of Missouri"). In addition to those courts that strain to read these types of
clauses as non-exclusive, some courts merely find them "ambiguous" and then construe
the language against the drafter. See, eg., Citro Florida, Inc. v. Citrovale, S.A., 760 F.2d
1231, 1231 (1lth Cir. 1985); Keaty v. Freeport Indonesia, Inc., 503 F.2d 955, 956-57 (5th
Cir. 1974); First Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
This kind of interpretive problem can, of course, be avoided by making the parties' intent
crystal clear. See Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273,
275 (9th Cir. 1984) (forum-selection clause providing disputes "shall be litigated only in
the Superior Court... (and in no other)"); see also Gilbert, supra note 5, at 7 ("Needless
to say, when drafting a choice of forum provision one should always indicate the parties'
intent that the chosen forum is to be exclusive."). Less than perfect draftsmanship, how-
ever, should not allow a court to avoid determining whether a clause is reasonable.
Where unequal bargaining power or other circumstances make enforcement of the forum-
selection clause greatly unfair, the Bremen's reasonableness standard gives the court suffi-
cient discretion to so decide. When a court is in effect seeking to mitigate the harsh
effects of a particular clause, the solution is not to strike down the clause because of so-
called ambiguous language. Since appealability hinges on a correct reading of a clause's
exclusive or non-exclusive nature, this could shield a possibly erroneous order from effec-
tive appellate review. See infra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
44. 844 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988).
45. Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 907 (3d Cir.
1988) (emphasis added). Hodes involved the same forum-selection clause at issue in
Chasser. In Hodes the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held the clause was en-
forceable and dismissed the suit, finding the clause permitted a suit to be brought only in
Naples. See Hodes, 858 F.2d at 916. By treating the forum-selection clause as merely a
consent to jurisdiction, the Second Circuit in Chasser effectively rendered the forum-se-
lection clause non-exclusive; the opinion, however, did not quote or discuss any of the
actual language of the clause. See Chasser, 844 F.2d at 50-56.
46. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 55. Elsewhere, however, the Second Circuit has recoguized
the exclusionary function of an exclusive forum-selection clause. See Karl Koch Erecting
Co. v. New York Convention Center Dev. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 464, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(language of the clause "is necessarily aimed at preventing [plaintiff] from dragging [de-
fendant] into a court other than the one selected by the agreement"), aff'd, 838 F.2d 656
(2d Cir. 1988).
47. The interpretive omission in Chasser is perhaps not as "egregious" as the district
court's misinterpretation in Sterling Forest, see Sterling Forest Assocs., Ltd. v. Barnett-
Range Corp., 840 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussed supra in notes 38-43 and accompa-
nying text); nevertheless, in making irrelevant any distinction between exclusive and non-
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Finding the order denying enforcement of the forum-selection clause
unappealable, the Second Circuit did not reach the issue of the clause's
enforceability. While the facts in Chasser suggest grounds on which a
court might have reasonably refused to enforce the clause as a matter of
equity,48 the Second Circuit strained to dispose of the case on procedural
grounds. In so doing the court not only ignored the plain language of the
clause, but also effectively extinguished the very right the clause sought
to secure.
It is the loss of this right-the right to avoid being forced to litigate in
a court other than the one agreed to-that makes an order denying a
motion to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause effectively unreview-
able after final judgment,49 and the loss on which the need for immediate
appeal turns.
II. IMMEDIATE APPEAL UNDER THE COHEN COLLATERAL ORDER
DOCTRINE
A. The Final Judgment Rule
The foundation of appellate jurisdiction in the federal courts is the
final judgment rule, embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which provides that
the courts of appeals have the power to review all "final decisions" of the
district courts." In applying the statute, however, courts have not ar-
rived at a precise definition of a final judgment.51 While the Supreme
Court has said a final judgment is one that "ends the litigation on the
exclusive clauses, the decision frustrates the Bremen policy of providing greater certainty
and predictability in contracts by allowing parties to predetermine where they will be
sued.
48. The plaintiffs in Chasser were passengers aboard a ship hijacked by Palestinian
terrorists. The hijackers held captive and terrorized the passengers and killed one person
on board. See Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 217 (1988). A court could have considered these extreme unforeseen circum-
stances in deciding whether to enforce the clause. See Gilbert, supra note 5, at 72 ("the
reasonableness test is flexible enough to allow courts to consider forum selection clauses
in the light of basic equitable principles of individualization of justice, good faith, and
relief from hardship"). The district court in Chasser, however, found the clause unen-
forceable on the narrow ground of lack of adequate notice. See Chasser, 844 F.2d at 51-
52. But see Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 910 (3d Cir.
1988) (same forum-selection clause as in Chasser held to be enforceable and to reasonably
communicate its terms).
49. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). Section 1291 provides in relevant part: "The courts
of appeals [other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal CircuitJ shall
have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States .... "
51. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) ("No verbal formula
yet devised can explain prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an ut-
terly reliable guide for the future."); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148,
152 (1964) ("[I]t is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming
within what might well be called the 'twilight zone' of finality."); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962) ("The Court has adopted essentially practical
tests for identifying those judgments which are, and those which are not, to be considered
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merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg-
ment,"52 the Court has also said that "'final' . . . does not necessarily
mean the last order possible to be made in a case."53 This confusion
stems from competing policies underlying the final judgment rule. 4
The fundamental policy reflected in the rule is the prevention of piece-
meal appeals." Combining all appeals into one review at the end of the
lower court proceeding reduces the expense and delay caused by interloc-
utory appeals.5 6 In addition to promoting judicial efficiency, the final
judgment rule has been justified on the ground that it helps maintain the
trial judge's independence and underscores the deference owed by appel-
late courts to the trial judge.5 7
These policies notwithstanding, denying immediate appeal to some
technically non-final orders can amount to a denial of justice. 8 Conse-
quently, courts often give the final judgment rule a practical rather than a
literal construction. 9 The Supreme Court has indicated that in some
cases a weighing process is appropriate: "[I]n deciding the question of
finality the most important competing considerations are 'the inconven-
ience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of
denying justice by delay on the other.' "I
These considerations have led to both statutory and judicial exceptions
to the final judgment rule in order to mitigate its harsh effects. 6 ' Because
'final.' "); see also Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539, 540
(1932); Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 Tex. L. Rev. 292, 295-96 (1966).
52. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373-74 (1981); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
467 (1978).
53. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964); see Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985).
54. See generally 9 J. Moore, B. Ward & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 110.07,
at 107-11 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing policies underlying final judgment rule).
55. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373-74 (1981); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974); Cobbledick v. United States 309 U.S. 323,
325 (1940); In re Licht & Semonoff, 796 F.2d 564, 569 (1st Cir. 1986).
56. See Firestone, 449 U.S. at 374 (final judgment rule "serves the important purpose
of promoting efficient judicial administration").
57. See id.; Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978); see also Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 31 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
58. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964) (important
consideration in deciding question of finality is "danger of denying justice by delay").
59. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 471; Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152; DiBella v.
United States, 369 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1962); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S.
555, 558 (1963); Local No. 438 Constr. & Gen. Laborer's Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542,
549 (1963); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); In re
Cessna Distributorship Antitrust Litigation, 532 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir. 1976); Frank,
supra note 51, at 295.
60. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964) (quoting Dick-
inson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)).
61. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982) (permitting immediate appeal of interlocu-
tory orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refus-
ing to dissolve or modify injunctions"); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124-25
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an order denying a forum-selection clause dismissal motion leaves the
action pending, it cannot be called a final judgment; to be immediately
appealable, therefore, it must come within one of the exceptions to the
final judgment rule.
B. The Cohen Collateral Order Doctrine
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,62 the Supreme Court cre-
ated a judicial exception to the final judgment rule. The Cohen collateral
order doctrine allows for immediate appeal of district court orders that
finally determine claims of right separate from and "collateral" to rights
asserted in the action.63 In a later decision, the Court set out the precise
requirements the order must satisfy to come within the exception. The
order must: first, "conclusively determine the disputed question"; sec-
ond, "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of
the action"; and third, "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment."'
Cohen's threshold requirement of a conclusive determination of the
disputed question is satisfied by a district court order that is intended as
the final word on the issue, even though it may be technically amenda-
ble.65 An order likely to be reassessed by the court after further develop-
ments in the litigation or to remain "open, unfinished or inconclusive"66
is characterized as "inherently tentative" and thus fails to meet the first
requirement.67
The second Cohen factor requires that the order "resolve an important
issue completely separate from the merits."' 68 If the issue is enmeshed in
the factual and legal issues of the cause of action, then an appellate court
(1962) (discussing exceptions to final judgment rule). For a detailed discussion of the
chief judicial exception to the final judgment rule, see infra notes 63-73 and accompany-
ing text.
62. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
63. See id. at 546. In Cohen, a shareholder derivative action, the district court denied
defendant's motion to require the plaintiff to post security for costs as required by a state
statute. The Supreme Court held that the order was immediately appealable because it
"appears to fall in that small class which finally determiie claims of right separable from,
and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated." Id.
64. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
65. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12
(1983).
66. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
67. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n. 11(1978). In Coopers &
Lybrand the Court held that an order denying a motion for class certification is inher-
ently tentative because it is subject to revision by the district court. See id. at 469. On the
other hand, an order requiring defendants in a class action suit to pay 90 percent of the
notification costs was held to be a collateral order, satisfying the first requirement because
the court "conclusively rejected [defendants'] contention that they could not lawfully be
required to bear [this] expense." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171-72
(1974).
68. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.
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can only effectively review the decision after a full exposition of those
issues; as the Supreme Court cautioned in Cohen, immediate appeal of
decisions that are "steps" toward final judgment is not justified.69 An
additional element contained in the second prong of the Cohen test is a
requirement that the order resolve an "important" issue.7" This is satis-
fied if the issue is important to the parties, even though it is not of general
interest.71 The final Cohen requirement limits the reach of the collateral
order doctrine to orders affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost
without an immediate appeal.72 An order meeting this requirement is
one that, "unless it can be reviewed before [the proceedings terminate], it
never can be reviewed at all."'73
69. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The level
of stringency required by this prong of the Cohen test was the cause of a division in the
Supreme Court. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). Holding that an order
denying a claim of qualified immunity was appealable under Cohen, a plurality of the
court found the separability requirement satisfied because the order was "conceptually
distinct" from the merits of plaintiff's claim, even though the appellate court referred to
plaintiff's factual allegations. See id. at 527-28. The dissenters found the "conceptual
distinction" test a "toothless standard" and held out for the more stringent requirement
that the issue be completely separate from the merits. See id. at 547-49.
70. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (to come within
Cohen, an "order must.., resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits
of the action" (emphasis added)).
71. See In re Cessna Distributorship Antitrust Litigation, 532 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir.
1976). In Cessna the court noted that the Supreme Court has found several orders to be
appealable as collateral orders under Cohen even though the issue was important only to
the parties. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (order denying reduction of bail);
Roberts v. United States District Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (order denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis). The First Circuit, however, requires that the order present
"an important and unsettled question of controlling law" as an additional fourth criterion
to be met before the collateral order doctrine applies. United States v. Sorren, 605 F.2d
1211, 1213 (1st Cir. 1979); accord In re Licht & Semonoff, 796 F.2d 564, 570-71 (lst Cir.
1986). Although this additional requirement has not been adopted by the Supreme
Court, the Court may in the future choose to do so as a way to restrict the reach of the
Cohen doctrine:
I note that today's result could also be reached by application of the rule
adopted by the First Circuit, that to come within the Cohen exception the issue
on appeal must involve "an important and unsettled question of controlling law,
not merely a question of the proper exercise of the trial court's discretion."
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133, 1145 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (quoting Boreri v. Fiat S.P.A., 763 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1985)).
72. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (1985); Helstoski v.
Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-08 (1979); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-62
(1977).
73. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951).
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III. APPLICATION OF THE COHEN COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE
TO DENIALS OF MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED ON FORUM-
SELECTION CLAUSES
A. Characterizing the Forum-Selection Clause Dismissal Motion as an
Application for Specific Performance
When a party commences suit in violation of an exclusive forum-selec-
tion clause, the defendant will most likely seek to enforce the clause by
moving to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue.74 If this
motion is denied and immediate appeal is sought, proper resolution of
the claim requires the appellate court to distinguish the order from other
pretrial forum rulings customarily denied immediate appeal, such as a
remand motion or a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens or
routine lack of personal jurisdiction." A forum-selection clause dismis-
sal motion is fundamentally distinguishable by its contractual basis. In
practical effect the motion seeking to force the plaintiff to sue in the con-
tractually agreed-upon forum should be viewed as an application for spe-
cific performance.76
Courts analyzing the appealability of a motion based on a forum-selec-
tion clause solely in terms of its procedural label have overlooked the
underlying substantive issues. An order denying a motion to dismiss
based on a forum-selection clause is not a purely jurisdictional decision
but a substantive contract law decision on the enforceability of the
clause.77
When a forum-selection clause is a substantive bargaining point for the
74. See, e.g., Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 109
S. Ct. 217 (1988); Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047,
1047 (3d Cir. 1987); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190,
193 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983); see also Mullenix, supra note 33, at 328
n.188 (citing cases in which party sought to enforce forum-selection clause by moving to
dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
75. See, eg., Louisiana Ice Cream Distribs., Inc. v. Carvel Corp., 821 F.2d 1031, 1033
(5th Cir. 1987) ("We perceive no principled way to distinguish a ruling on a motion to
dismiss for improper venue.., from these other forum rulings."). Although the motion
to dismiss for improper venue in Louisiana Ice Cream was based on a forum-selection
clause and thus sought enforcement of a contractual right, this did not appear to add
anything to the court's analysis of the appealability of the order denying the motion.
76. See Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 194 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983) ("motion to dismiss an action in order to give
effect to a forum selection clause is in practical effect an application for specific perform-
ance of that contractual provision"). The Supreme Court noted this aspect of a motion to
enforce a forum-selection clause in The Bremen: "The threshold question is whether
[the] court should have exercised its jurisdiction ... by specifically enforcing the forum
clause." The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (emphasis added).
77. Confronting a substantially similar issue, one court held that an otherwise unap-
pealable remand order based on a forum-selection clause was reviewable as a "contract
interpretation order." See Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741
F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir. 1984).
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parties, it affects other terms of a contract.78 Even where boilerplate lan-
guage is used, a forum-selection clause may be considered a "vital" part
of the agreement because the contractual negotiations were conducted
with the consequences of the forum clause in mind.79 By refusing to
enforce the clause, the court may affect the consideration exchanged and
thus shift the equities of the agreement.80 In conceptually viewing a mo-
tion to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause as an application for
specific performance, courts will avoid the risk of overlooking the sub-
stantive contractual issues inherent in the motion. This treatment as-
sures that important contractual rights will not be glossed over by a blind
application of jurisdictional law.
B. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Qualifies for Appeal as a
Collateral Order
An order refusing to dismiss an action brought in violation of an exclu-
sive forum-selection clause qualifies as a collateral order under Cohen.
Such an order satisfies the first Cohen requirement because it is a conclu-
sive determination of the disputed question."' The order is not inher-
ently tentative because the district court would not ordinarily reconsider
its decision during the course of the litigation. Once dismissal is denied,
the proceeding turns to the merits of plaintiff's cause of action; thus, the
order was necessarily "made with the expectation that [it would] be the
final word on the subject." 2 Moreover, the order conclusively deter-
mines the law of the case and the location in which the suit is to be
tried. 3
Cohen's separability requirement-resolution of an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action-is also satisfied be-
cause the clause "establishes a legal right which is analytically distinct
78. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 14 (1972) ("it would be
unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct their negotiations, including fixing
the monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in
their calculations"); Note, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and
Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 Minn. L. Rev.
1090, 1091 n.12 (1988).
79. See Note, supra note 78 at 1091 n. 12; Heller Financial, Inc. v. Nutra Food, Inc.,
655 F. Supp. 1432, 1434 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
80. See Note, supra note 78, at 1093 n.16.
81. Like the rejection of the claim to security under the state statute in Cohen, the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on forum-selection clause grounds is not "open, unfin-
ished or inconclusive." The district court's decision is "concluded and closed and its
decision final." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); see also
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) (order denying motion to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds was "a complete, formal, and, in the trial court, final rejection"
of the asserted claim).
82. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 n.14
(1983).
83. See Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848,
850 (8th Cir. 1986); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190,
195 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983).
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from the rights being asserted in the dispute to which it is addressed." 4
An order denying a forum-selection clause dismissal motion is also im-
portant to the parties; it conclusively determines where the suit will be
heard and whether the contractual right will be enforced. In addition,
judicial economy is preserved because the appeal will involve only the
issue of the enforceability of the forum-selection clause and not the mer-
its of any claims or defenses in the suit. 6
The third arm of the Cohen test has proved to be the most troublesome
for courts applying the collateral order doctrine to orders denying forum-
selection clause dismissal motions.87 Properly interpreting the rights
conferred by an exclusive forum-selection clause88 is essential to the de-
termination that the decision is effectively unreviewable. The right to be
subject to litigation only in the designated forum has been irrevocably
lost after a trial has taken place in a forum not agreed to by the parties.
In addition, if the defendant loses on the merits, the order denying the
dismissal motion is likely to be unreviewable because the defendant
would not be able to show the prejudice necessary to obtain a reversal.89
A party who bargained for a contractual right should not have to show
prejudice before the right is enforced.9" It is the loss of the contract right
and not the outcome of the trial that is the injury.91
84. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 195; see Farmland, 806 F.2d at 850. A choice-of-forum
clause may be accompanied by a choice-of-law clause, which determines the law to be
applied in any litigation between the parties. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 133. Although
courts find the order is conclusive because it "establish[es] the law of the case," this
would only be so when there is not an enforceable choice-of-law provision. However, an
order refusing to dismiss an action in violation of a forum-selection clause conclusively
determines the jurisdiction in which the suit must be tried. See Farmland, 806 F.2d at
850.
85. See Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848,
850 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Cessna Distributorship Antitrust Litigation, 532 F.2d 64, 67
(8th Cir. 1976).
86. See Farmland, 806 F.2d at 850; see also Sterling Forest Assocs., Ltd. v. Barnett-
Range Corp., 840 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (order denying motion to remand on
forum-selection clause grounds "easily" meets requirement that it be completely separate
from the merits); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273,
278 (9th Cir. 1984) (order granting motion to remand based on forum-selection clause
"conclusively determines enforceability of the clause, an issue completely separate from
the merits of [plaintiff's] breach of contract claim"). But see Louisiana Ice Cream Dis-
tribs., Inc. v. Carvel Corp., 821 F.2d 1031, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987) (interpretation of ambig-
uous forum-selection clause not separate from merits).
87. See, e.g., Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 196 ("more difficult question is whether the
third Coopers & Lybrand factor is satisfied").
88. See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
89. See Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848,
851 (8th Cir. 1986); Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 196; cf Sterling Forest Assocs., Ltd. v.
Barnett-Range Corp., 840 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (denial of transfer motion based
on a forum-selection clause is final because "it is inconceivable that [defendant] could
prove that a different result would have been reached had the case been tried in [the
chosen forum]").
90. See Farmland, 806 F.2d at 851.
91. This is true whether the defendant wins or loses. If the defendant is successful on
the merits, the order denying the motion to dismiss will, of course, evade review. See
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Some courts have held that a denial of a forum-selection clause dismis-
sal motion is immediately appealable under Cohen.92 Perhaps the best
rationale was articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Farmland Industries,
Inc. v. Frazier-Parrot Commodities, Inc.93 Emphasizing the tradition of
taking a practical approach to issues under the final judgment rule, the
court found that the order denying enforcement of the forum-selection
clause would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment because the
right to a single trial in a preselected forum will have been lost at that
point.94 Allowing the suit to proceed in a forum not agreed to in the
contract would effectively deprive the defendant of a contractual right.95
This approach, in recognizing the collateral nature of the order and the
importance of the contractual right, is the most consistent with the poli-
cies of the Bremen.96
C. Analogy to Order Denying Claim of Double Jeopardy
in Abney v. United States
The right conferred by an exclusive forum-selection clause is analo-
gous to the right to be free from double jeopardy, which was at stake in
Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 196 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983). Although pleased with the outcome, the defendant may
have incurred increased costs in litigating in a forum not anticipated in the contract.
92. See, e.g., Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 908 (3d
Cir. 1988); Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047, 1048 (3d
Cir. 1987); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 355-56
(3d Cir. 1986); Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 197. The Coastal Steel court also found the
order appealable on two alternate grounds: (1) as an interlocutory decision under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982) (providing for interlocutory review of orders "granting, con-
tinuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions"); and (2) as a petition for a writ of
mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (allowing issuance of writs in "aid
of" jurisdiction when "necessary or appropriate").
93. 806 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1986).
94. See id. at 851.
95. See id.
96. The Third Circuit reached the same result, albeit through more esoteric reason-
ing. It relied on a statute providing that there could be no reversal of "matters in abate-
ment." Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 196 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983). The statute provides: "There shall be no reversal in
the Supreme Court or a court of appeals for error in ruling upon matters in abatement
which do not involve jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982). Although the court ac-
knowledged that "[n]ineteeth century lawyers were obviously better versed in the mean-
ing of pleas of abatement," Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 196, it found that the statute made
the district court's refusal to enforce the forum-selection clause unreviewable after finaljudgment. See id. However, the use of this statute to find the order unreviewable has
been criticized. See Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 53-54 (2d Cir.) (re-jecting use of statute to find order unreviewable), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988);
Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 210-12 (Rosenn, J., concurring) (rejecting use of "old, obscure
statute" (28 U.S.C. § 2105) to find order unreviewable; finding order appealable instead
under balancing approach in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964));
see also 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3903 at
412, 413 (1976) (referring to § 2105 as "[o]ne of the most commonly ignored provisions
of the Judicial Code").
FOR UM-SELECTION CLA USES
Abney v. United States.97 There the Supreme Court held that an order
denying a claim of double jeopardy was immediately appealable under
the collateral order doctrine.98 The Court held this order was effectively
unreviewable because the right not to stand trial a second time for the
same offense is effectively denied when the second trial proceeds. 99 Simi-
larly, the right conferred by an exclusive forum-selection clause-the
right to a single trial in the preselected forum-is lost when a trial pro-
ceeds to final judgment in a different forum. At this point the "legal and
practical value"' "° ° of the asserted right has been destroyed; the denial of
immediate review would thus "render impossible any review
whatsoever." °10 1
The court in Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines dismissed the analogy to
the double jeopardy rights at stake in Abney because the right to litigate
in a particular forum is not "of the same magnitude as a constitutional
right.""0 2 The Supreme Court, however, has not limited the collateral
order doctrine to constitutional claims.10 3 In a footnote to the Abney
opinion, the Court specifically referred to the similarities between the
non-constitutional rights in Cohen and the constitutional claim of double
jeopardy in Abney:
A cogent analogy can be drawn to the Cohen decision. There, the cor-
porate defendant claimed that the state security statute, if applicable,
conferred on it a right not to face trial at all unless the dissatisfied
shareholder first posted security for the costs of the litigation. By per-
mitting an immediate appeal under those circumstances, this Court
made sure that the benefits of the statute were not "canceled out."'0
4
The "essence" of the right claimed under an exclusive forum-selection
97. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
98. See id. at 662-63.
99. See id. at 662.
100. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978).
101. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981) (quoting United
States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971)).
102. Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
217 (1988).
103. Cohen, the case that announced the collateral order doctrine, was based on a non-
constitutional right. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)
(right under state statute to security in shareholder's derivative suit); see also Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 31 (1983) (right to proceed
with federal action despite pendency of similar state court action); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (right to avoid paying 90 percent of notice costs in a class
action suit); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S.
684, 688-89 (1950) (right to attachment of vessel in admiralty action).
104. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 n.7 (1977).
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1981), the Court also
saw a direct parallel between the non-constitutional right in Cohen and the constitutional
claims of double jeopardy in Abney and excessive bail in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1
(1951), because "each involved an asserted right the legal and practical value of which
could be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial." Firestone, 449 U.S. at 377
(quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)).
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clause is a right not to stand trial anywhere but in the selected forum.10 5
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this in The Bremen; the pur-
pose of the clause there was to prevent the defendant towing company
from being subject to suit in any of the myriad jurisdictions through
which its ship traveled.106 The claimed right is thus an entitlement not
to stand trial under certain circumstances that is effectively lost if the
case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Like the statute in Cohen,
which prohibited a shareholder's suit unless security was first posted, a
forum-selection clause establishes a procedural rule to be followed in sub-
sequent litigation; like the benefits of the statute in Cohen, the benefits of
an exclusive forum-selection clause, so proudly heralded by The Bremen,
will be "canceled out" unless immediate appeal is permitted.
CONCLUSION
A district court order refusing to dismiss an action brought in viola-
tion of an exclusive forum-selection clause meets all of the requirements
for immediate appeal as a collateral order. It conclusively determines
where the litigation will take place; it resolves an issue completely sepa-
rate from the merits of the cause of action; and it is effectively unreview-
able on appeal from final judgment. Unless immediate appeal is allowed,
moreover, the party seeking to enforce the clause will be deprived of a
bargained-for contractual right. This right cannot be vindicated on ap-
peal from final judgment because the right to litigate only in the forum
selected by the parties will have been irretrievably lost. This result will
defeat the purpose of the parties in negotiating the clause: to eliminate
the risk of suit in an unknown forum. The expense and burden of de-
fending a suit in any court that might assert jurisdiction over a dispute
between the parties can be a substantial hindrance to commercial trans-
actions. These considerations led the Supreme Court to validate forum-
selection clauses in The Bremen. The importance of the right to have a
dispute litigated in a single preselected forum and the federal policies
105. In Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 108 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 (1988), the Supreme Court
said the "critical question" in deciding whether an order is effectively unreviewable under
Cohen "is whether 'the essence' of the claimed right is a right not to stand trial." Id.
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)). When a forum-selection clause
is viewed consistently with the Bremen principles it clearly satisfies this test. In Van
Cauwenberghe, the Court held that an order denying a motion to dismiss on the ground
of forum non conveniens is not immediately appealable under Cohen because the forum
non conveniens issue was not completely separate from the merits of the action. The
Court found that the various factors considered in assessing a forum non conveniens
motion would "substantially overlap factual and legal issues of the underlying dispute."
Id. at 1953. A forum-selection clause on the other hand has been held to "establish[ ] a
legal right which is analytically distinct from the rights being asserted in the dispute to
which it is addressed." Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d
190, 195 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983).
106. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972).
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encouraging parties to negotiate forum-selection clauses therefore require
that the order be permitted immediate appeal.
Howard W. Schreiber

